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1. ABSTRACT
Modern vehicles rely on a variety of electronic systems
and components. One of those components is the vehicle
key. Today, a key typically implements at least three func-
tions: mechanical locking with a key blade, the electronic
immobilizer to autorise the start of the engine, and the re-
mote keyless entry (RKE) system that allows to wirelessly
(un)lock the doors and disable the alarm system. These
main components of a vehicle key are shown in Figure 1.
mechanical part
(key blade)
Remote keyless entry
(433/315/868 MHz)
RKE 
C
RF
Immo. 
RFID
Immobilizer
(125 kHz)
RKE antenna
optional
Button(s)
Figure 1: Main components of a vehicle key: me-
chanics, immobilizer, RKE
For the mechanical part of the vehicle key, it is well known
that the key blade can be easily copied and that the locking
cylinder can be bypassed with other means (using so-called
“decoders” or simply a screwdriver). In contrast, immobi-
lizer and RKE rely on wireless protocols to cryptographi-
cally authenticate the vehicle key to the car. Immobilizers
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employ radio frequency identification (RFID) transponders
to carry out a challenge-response protocol over a low-range
bidirectional link at a frequency of 125 kHz. In the past,
researchers have revealed severe flaws in the cryptography
and protocols used by immobilizers, leading to the break of
the major systems Megamos, Hitag2, and DST40 [7, 6, 1].
In contrast to the immobilizer, the RKE part uses unidi-
rectional communication (the vehicle only receives, the key
fob only transmits) over a high-range wireless link with op-
erating distances of tens to one hundred meters. These sys-
tems are based on rolling codes, which essentially transmit
a counter (that is incremented on each button press) in a
cryptographically authenticated manner.
Until recently, the security of automotive RKE had been
scrutinized to a lesser degree than that of immobilizers, even
though vulnerabilities in similar systems have been known
since 2008 with the attacks on KeeLoq [3]. Other results
reported in the literature include an analytical attack on
a single, outdated vehicle [2] and the so-called “RollJam”
technique [5], which is based on a combination of replay and
selective jamming.
In 2016, it was shown that severe flaws exist in the RKE
systems of major automotive manufacturers [4]. On the one
hand, the VW group (Volkswagen, Seat, Sˇkoda, Audi) based
the security of their RKE system on a few global crypto-
graphic keys, potentially affecting hundreds of million vehi-
cles world-wide. By extracting these global keys from the
firmware of electronic controls units (ECUs) once, an adver-
sary is able to create a duplicate of the owner’s RKE fob by
eavesdropping a single rolling code.
The second case study in [4] exposes new cryptographic
weaknesses in the Hitag2 cipher when used for RKE. Ap-
plying a correlation-based attack, an adversary can recover
the 48-bit cryptographic key by eavesdropping four to eight
rolling codes and performing a one-minute computation on
a standard laptop. Again, this attack affects millions of ve-
hicle world-wide. Manufacturers that used Hitag2 in their
RKE system include Alfa Romeo, Peugeot, Lancia, Opel,
Renault, and Ford among others.
In this keynote talk, we will present the results of [4] and
put them in into a broader context by revisiting the history
of attacks on RKE systems and automotive electronics.
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